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Managing the Costs and Risks of Housing Finance: 
A New Role for Actuaries 
Anthony Asher* 
Abstract 
Housing finance is a nontraditional field where actuarial expertise could be 
applied fruitfully. The development of mortgage instruments requires the ap-
plication of financial mathematics, while the evaluation and management of the 
financial risks to which borrowers and lenders are exposed require a knowledge 
of insurance principles. This paper splits the financial costs of home owner-
ship into several components: those that arise from inflation, risk, adminis-
tration, and the residual real interest charge. The risk component further is 
partitioned into life contingencies, economic contingencies, and various moral 
hazards. This analysis provides a basis for future financial innovation, high-
lights where government intervention may prove productive, and suggests a 
number of areas of possible actuarial involvement. 
Key words and phrases: mortgage, insurance, government guarantees, inf1a-
tion, life cycle 
1 Introduction 
In their search for new areas of involvement, actuaries may find the 
field of housing finance both accessible and fruitful. The accessibil-
ity stems from the convergence of financial markets and the fading of 
the boundaries between insurers and mortgage finance institutions. In 
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addition, there is a fundamental similarity between insurers and mort-
gage lenders: both are concerned with risk and security. Whether this 
becomes a fruitful area of expansion depends on the skills and energies 
of the actuaries concerned. 
In any event, it would help actuaries if they better understood why 
some of the risks associated with the various types of home mortgages 
can, and even should, be insured. The need for mortgage insurance 
(for both lender and borrower) offers opportunities for those actuaries 
involved in product development. This paper is intended to highlight 
some of those areas in the development and evaluation of new mortgage 
products (for borrowers and lenders) where actuaries can playa role. l 
In the following sections, the basic types of mortgage products are 
examined. To facilitate this examination, the interest charged by mort-
gage lenders is divided into four components: 
1. An allowance for inflation; 
2. Charges for risk of default; 
3. Costs of administration; 
4. Net real interest.2 
These components are discussed in Sections 2 to 5, respectively. 
2 Inflation 
2.1 The Need for Varying Payments 
International norms are that housing loan payments should not ex-
ceed 25 percent to 30 percent of gross income and that the total amounts 
borrowed be no more than three to four years' annual salary. For a 20 
year loan, these limitations are more or less compatible with nominal 
interest rates of 8 percent or less per annum. Once nominal interest 
rates exceed 8 percent (as is likely with double digit inflation rates), 
it is no longer possible to borrow three years' salary and still pay the 
1 Financial innovation in home lending markets also includes variations on the theme 
of securitization (of mortgages) described by Woolford (1991) at a Society of Actuar-
ies meeting. This subject has been covered extensively in the literature (see also, for 
instance, Schwartz and Torous (1992) and the March 1994 edition of Housing Finance 
International). It is not the business of this paper, however, which focuses more on the 
mortgage instruments themselves. 
2The interest charge will include an allowance for the profit of the mortgage lender. 
The considerations involved in determining the profit are too complex to discuss here. 
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interest charges from current income. Extending the term of the loan 
makes little difference. A 50 percent increase in the term, for instance, 
will increase the amount that can be borrowed by only 14 percent (at 
an interest rate of 8 percent). 
As the rate of inflation increases, it therefore would seem that lend-
ing institutions should be prepared to lend a portion of these inter-
est payments to the borrowers. This would restore them to the cash 
flow position they had enjoyed before the rise in inflation, assuming 
that the present value of future income remains unchanged. Malpezzi 
(1990) gives examples from a number of countries of experiments with 
a variety of mortgage products that allow for greater flexibility and af-
fordability, particularly in an inflationary environment. 
One obvious solution is a mortgage instrument where a proportion 
of the nominal interest due is added to the amounts outstanding and 
the mortgage repayments are increased in nominal terms each year. 
Several of these instruments have been devised and used in different 
countries, with the rate of increase being determined in a variety of 
ways. Though there appears to be no standard nomenclature, these in-
struments seem to fit into three broad categories: low start mortgages, 
progressive annuity mortgages, and indexed mortgages. Formulae for 
the different types of mortgage instruments ,~e given in the appendix. 
Given their expertise in manipulating interest rates, cash flow test-
ing, and matching assets and liabilities, actuaries should be able to 
make significant contributions in designing mortgage products and in 
matching mortgage assets with appropriate liabilities. 
2.2 The Slow Response 
Not all countries have institutions that have responded to an in-
crease in nominal rates by introducing appropriate instruments. For 
example, the annual inflation rate has averaged over 14 percent for the 
past 20 years in South Africa, with nominal mortgage rates averaging 
just under 16 percent. Yet no increasing mortgage product has been 
publicly offered. Malpezzi (1990) shows the problem is not unique to 
South Africa. 
Why have financial institutions been so slow in adapting? The an-
swer probably includes elements of inertia, lack of expertise, and (quite 
proper) prudence. In his chapter that examines the effects of infla-
tion on savings, Hadjimatheou (1987) records several studies that have 
found that higher inflation rates appear to create greater uncertainty 
and lead to greater savings by individuals. There is other evidence, pre-
sented later in this paper, that higher inflation may increase the risk of 
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borrowers defaulting on their loans. This lends some justification to 
the decisions by financial institutions to reduce their lending in times 
of higher inflation. 
To understand the issues better, the question needs to be placed 
within the broader problem technically described by economists as liq-
uidity constraints within the life cycle. Hadjimatheou quotes a summary 
of this idea by Hubbard and Judd (1986, p. 56): 
Hump-shaped lifetime earnings profiles rising towards mid-
dle age then leveling off and declining in old age imply that 
individuals will want to consume more than their current 
resources when young. They cannot do so if liquidity re-
straints are binding.3 
Even in the United States, which has not experienced long periods of 
double digit interest rates, the literature provides evidence that higher 
nominal rates reduce the demand for debt.4 Megbolugbe and Linneman 
(1993) describe several studies that find a negative correlation between 
inflation and home ownership. These appear to be related to liquid-
ity constraints. In economic terms, however, this represents a market 
failure. Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch (1987) point out that market fail-
ure can occur as a result<lof the absence of appropriate insurance mar-
kets. They ascribe this absence to the presence of antis election, 5 moral 
hazard,6 and general lack of knowledge about the risks. 
Actuaries have the expertise to address all of these questions (par-
ticularly those covering insurance) in a logically consistent manner. 
3Uquidity restraints result from unnecessary restrictions on the ability to borrow-
in this case on the strength of future earnings. 
4This reduction in the demand for debt is consistent with a failure to introduce new 
mortgage instruments. 
5 Antiselection is defined by the Society of Actuaries Committee on Actuarial Princi-
ples (1992) as a result of inadequate refinement of the risk classification system. 
6 Moral hazard occurs when the future. occurrence, timing, or severity of an insured 
event is controllable by the insured persons. Those risks that imply negligence rather 
than fraud are sometimes called morale hazard, but this distinction has not been used 
in this paper. 
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3 Risks 
3.1 Some Background 
3.1.1 Insurability: Private and Government 
The conditions under which a risk (or event) is said to be insurable 
have been established by the Society of Actuaries Committee on Actu-
arial Principles (1992, p. 587). An event is insurable if: 
1. It is associated with a phenomenon that is expected to display 
statistical regularity; 
2. It is contingent with respect to number of occurrences, timing, or 
severity; 
3. The fact of its occurrence is definitely determinable; 
4. Its occurrence results in undesirable economic consequences for 
one or more persons; and 
5. Its future occurrence, timing, or severity is neither precisely known 
nor controllable by these persons. 
Moral hazards are not entirely unmanageable. Profit sharing, no-
claim bonus, and the legal principle of indemnity all provide incentives 
to limit the number and size of claims. Careful definition of the insur-
able event that excludes those items under the control of the insured 
also allows for the extension of insurance markets. The courts can be 
used to challenge fraudulent claims. 
Government attempts to insure, rather than to manage, the risks 
due to moral hazards are likely to result in unintended subsidies to 
unintended beneficiaries. Recent examples can be seen in the collapse 
of the savings and loans deposit insurance industry in the United States 
and the insolvency of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund in South Africa. 
The latter has been driven to insolvency by, among other things, a large 
number of fraudulent claims. 
The insurer can manage antiselection by obtaining sufficient infor-
mation to refine its risk classification system adequately. Antiselection 
also can be managed through government intervention in the form of 
a mandatory insurance system. The need for personal information is 
reduced, if not eliminated. 7 
7Some persons' sense of equity might be offended if there were no differentiation 
between different risk classes. On the other hand, others might welcome the cross-
subsidies involved. 
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Cyclical risks, such as unemployment, do not always display the sta-
tistical regularity required for insurability. Williams and Heins (1976) 
give an argument for government intervention to insure such risks. 
Where there is mandatory insurance, economic viability can be ensured 
by increasing premiums or reducing benefits. 
Governments also may enter or create certain markets in countries 
where the private sector lacks the capital, technical capability, confi-
dence, or energy to introduce economically viable financial products. 
There appears to be no inherent reason why such initiatives could not 
be privatized subsequently. Grigsby (1990) points out that in the United 
States mortgage guarantee insurance was introduced by government 
and later was followed by private initiatives. 
3.1.2 Financial Planning 
Appropriate responses to the risks faced by both mortgage lenders 
and borrowers must be developed.8 Duncan (1988) provides an inter-
esting insight into the nature of the borrower's risks. His paper is based 
on a detailed longitudinal study from 1968 to 1979 of 5,000 families 
and is called the "Panel Study of Income Dynamics." He finds that fam-
ily income is surprisingly volatile, with nearly one third of the sample 
experiencing a drop in income of 50 percent or more. (Family, in this 
context, can refer to individuals living on their own.) His analysis of the 
life events that cause some of these financial reverses will be used be-
low. The results of the study highlight the need for financial planning 
and, where possible, appropriate insurance. 
Bragg (1992) suggests that actuaries can find a new role in finan-
cial counselling. Are they not in the best position to know which risks 
are important, what insurance is available, and how finances should be 
managed? 
Duncan's paper and the life cycle hypothesis of Modigliani (1986) 
provide a good foundation for such planning. The issues, as men-
tioned earlier, are lifetime earnings and consumption and their vari-
ability, as well as current liquidity. The life cycle hypothesis assumes 
individuals behave rationally. But without assistance in planning their 
expenditures, it is difficult to understand how they can make rational 
decisions. Actuarial involvement in the design of lifetime income and 
expenditure models could provide a link between research and practical 
applications. 
Bit is the author's conviction that the individual's risks need to be considered first 
and that the need for the security of financial institutions derives from this primary 
concern. 
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Proper financial planning may indicate that the risk to the borrower 
of a home loan is larger than was previously thought and that the insur-
ance necessary to manage the risk makes it too expensive. Thus, rather 
than making housing finance available to more persons, proper finan-
cial planning may reduce the demand for mortgages but fewer persons 
would suffer foreclosure. 
3.1.3 Life and Disability Coverage 
Mortgage lenders often require borrowers to obtain a credit death 
and disability life policy that covers the amount of the loan outstanding 
at the time of death or long-term disability. This may be inadequate, 
however, because death or disability can cause financial hardships of 
which meeting mortgage payments is only a part. The death and disabil-
ity insurance policy rather should be designed with the family's future 
in mind. The family needs insurance to cover disaster and also may 
need assistance in rearranging its financial affairs after a claim. The 
institution's need to protect itself against loss probably can be met by 
a relatively small amount of life insurance (enough to cover the differ-
ence between the market value of the collateral and the outstanding 
loan if the latter is larger). 
Duncan (1988) confirms that disability and illness are important 
causes of financial hardship. In his tabulation of the causes of the 
large declines in income, disability and illness are responsible in 12 
percent of the cases for men between 25 and 45 and in 9 percent of the 
cases for women. This compares with only 3 percent for the death of 
a spouse, confirming the relative importance of disability compared to 
death. Unfortunately, disability coverage is not as readily available as 
life insurance. Lending institutions may be able to assist aspiring home 
owners obtain disability insurance by pooling borrowers into groups. 
3.2 Cost Increases 
Even if spared death or disability, borrowers still may find them-
selves unable to meet repayments because their costs and their incomes 
are not necessarily matched. This subsection looks at major reasons for 
cost increases, the next subsection examines other causes of income re-
duction. 
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3.2.1 Interest Rates 
Holders of adjustable rate mortgages9 are particularly exposed to 
the risk of an increase in interest rates. Higher inflation rates appear to 
aggravate the problem; not only does the level of nominal interest rates 
rise, but short-term interest rates appear to display greater volatility 
(Chan et al. 1992). 
Government protection from the risk of high interest rates, in the 
form of interest rate controls or subsidies, has not proved effective in 
volatile environments. Malpezzi (1990) argues against the use of such 
interventions. He finds that the distortions introduced into financial 
markets inhibit the appropriate allocations of resources without giving 
concomitant benefits to the poor. 
Three mortgage products are commonly available as alternatives to 
government intervention: fixed interest mortgages; dual index mort-
gages; and privately subsidized mortgages. 
• Fixed Interest Mortgages: Here the interest rate and the repay-
ments remain unchanged throughout the term of the mortgage. 
This provides a level of certainty and probably makes this the 
most attractive mortgage product from the borrower's perspec-
tive. Such mortgages are particularly popular in the United States, 
but are regarded as too expensive in many other countries. Dia-
mond and Lee (1992) show, however, that fixed interest mortgages 
are used in Denmark, France, and Germany (but without a prepay-
ment option). This suggests that the product might be considered 
in other countries, at least those with relatively stable single digit 
interest rates. 
Fixed interest mortgages, however, present a particular problem 
when it includes an option for borrowers to prepay the loan with-
out penalty.lO Schwartz and Torous (1992) have calculated in-
surance fees for the prepayment risk, but it is not clear that the 
prepayments display sufficient statistical regularity to be insur-
able. Mortgage lenders at times have taken a large proportion of 
the risk themselves, but this can prove disastrous. Grigsby (1990) 
gIn an adjustable rate mortgage, interest rates and mortgage payments are fixed for 
a specified period (anywhere from one month to five years). At the end of this period, 
the outstanding balance is determined; new mortgage payments are recalculated using 
this outstanding balance and current market rates. The new rate and the new level of 
payments remain fixed for another speCified period. This process is repeated until the 
mortgage is repaid. Adjustable rate mortgages are common outside the United States. 
lOBorrowers tend to repay their loans early when interest rates have fallen and they 
can refinance at a lower rate of interest. 
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ascribes the American savings and loan debacle of the 1980s to, 
among other things, inadequate allowance for the mismatch of 
the term of their assets and liabilities caused partly by the pre-
payment option. 
• Dual Index Mortgages: Here the mortgage payments are increased 
in line with a wage-related index, while the cost of borrowing is 
related to market interest rates. Although not offering absolute 
protection against interest rate movements, the risk is deferred 
significantly and often will not give rise to losses. Dual indexed 
mortgages are more appropriate for countries with higher rates 
of interest; they are currently in favor with the World Bank. 
Roldan and Spoor (1992) tell how dual index mortgages have been 
introduced in Mexico with apparent success.ll A variant of the 
dual index mortgage was tried by one company in South Africa in 
the early 1980s: the lenders, however, suffered losses from loans 
still outstanding in the early 1990s. The problem was that the 
incomes of some borrowers did not keep pace with the required 
increases in the repayments. The loans of these borrowers became 
too large to be serviced and also exceeded the current market 
value of their homes. 
• Subsidized Mortgages: The third approach is for employers to 
offer a fixed and subsidized lower rate of interest or to. subsidize 
housing expenses on an income-related basis, as mentioned in 
Malpezzi (1990). This not only addresses the interest rate risk, 
but also the affordability of the loan. These subsidies, however, 
have become less popular over time as they are expensive and 
encourage overspending on housing. 
Asher (1992) describes yet another form of mortgage: a salary-linked 
mortgage.12 This type of mortgage links both the periodic mortgage 
payment and the interest rate to the borrower's income. The borrower 
is liable to pay a predetermined proportion of his or her income over the 
term of the loan. The proportion is equal to the initial loan divided by 
the product of current income and the agreed term. The amount out-
standing at any time is the product of the proportion calculated, the 
borrower's income at that time, and the remaining term. The interest 
earned by the lender in a salary linked mortgage is therefore depen-
dent on the growth of the borrower's remuneration. The loan can be 
11 In Mexico repayments are linked to the national minimum wage. 
12The concept of salary linkage is not that different from the income contingent loans 
described in Nerlove (1975) and elsewhere. 
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described as being linked to the index of the borrower's own income. 
A portfolio of such loans is particularly appropriate for defined benefit 
pension funds as it provides an asset matched to the liabilities as both 
are dependent on income growth. 
The link between income and mortgage payments introduces addi-
tional risks of antiselection and moral hazard. Antiselection may occur 
if individuals expecting lower salary growth are more likely to use such 
instruments. It should be feasible to develop classification models for 
potential borrowers to address this problem. Models can be developed 
that predict an individual's lifetime wage patterns. 
Moral hazard risks are directly analogous to those that arise in col-
lecting income tax. Income may be underreported (as in tax evasion), 
shifted to nontaxable sources (tax avoidance), and reduced by working 
less. Avoidance and evasion risks can be minimized by obtaining infor-
mation on income from the employers who sponsor the pension fund 
making the loans. 
Though the possible work disincentives cannot be gauged accurately, 
there are some studies of the problem. Tuomala (1990) reports that 
"most labor supply studies of men seem to indicate backward-sloping 
supply curves." Higher income leads to men taking more leisure (de-
scribed as an income effect), but the leisure is more expensive rela-
tive to other goods (which creates a substitution effect and reduces the 
leisure taken.) He lists 11 studies undertaken in the 1970s, of which 
seven showed the backward slope. Studies of women, however, usually 
have shown the normal forward slope. Brown (1983) gives more detail 
on some of these studies. A typical regression result with ten different 
parameters would produce an R2 of 0.25, explaining only 25 percent 
of variation between individuals. Little confidence, therefore, can be 
placed in these results. 
3.2.2 Individual Changes in Circumstance 
Increased costs for the borrower can arise from many sources in-
cluding divorce, inflation, illness, loss of or damage to possessions, 
increased family size, and the increased costs associated with children 
as they grow older. Duncan (1988) highlights the importance of di-
vorce, where another household with its overhead costs is created. The 
problems may be aggravated by excessive borrOwing-often credit pur-
chases not considered when the initial housing loan was granted. 
Higher levels of inflation appear to increase the possibility that cost 
increases may be unmanageable. Vining and Elwertowski (1976) con-
firm the widely accepted view that higher and more uncertain inflation 
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rates are linked with a wider dispersion of price movements. Their pa-
per covers all elements of the Consumer Price Index, including housing. 
This wider dispersion may increase the chances of a family being unable 
to meet all of their financial obligations and justifies greater prudence 
when lending in times of higher inflation. 
Mortgage lenders normally require borrowers to have homeown-
ers' hazard insurance to protect their collateral against damage (from 
storms, fire, flooding, etc.). While such damage can lead to significant 
losses that otherwise would cause the borrower severe financial hard-
ship, there are other risks to be considered such as unexpected medical 
costs to be considered. Thus, lenders may consider making health in-
surance a requirement in situations where adequate public care is not 
available.13 It is not possible, however, to insure against all fluctuations 
in expenditure. As a result, mortgage lenders still focus on the qual-
ity of the collateral rather than on the borrower's current and future 
income and expenses. 
An actuarial model of lifetime income and expenditure that allows 
for variability in income and expenditure would be helpful in the eval-
uation of loan applications. Such a model also could be used to assist 
in rescheduling mortgage payments. 
3.3 Reduction in Income 
3.3.1 Partial Reduction 
The risk of partial income 10SS14 appears to be greater with manual 
workers and older workers (those over the age of 50); see the surveys 
by Her Majesty's Stationery Office (1992) and Human Sciences Research 
Council (1990). Affordability standards imposed by lenders should al-
low for such fluctuations in income, particularly for older borrowers. 
At the present time in South Africa, a limited allowance sometimes is 
made for the risk of women's earnings declining as a result of childbirth, 
but not for other reasons. The salary-linked home finance product de-
scribed above also addresses this risk directly. 
13Because individual health insurance poliCies are relatively expensive, mortgage 
lenders may consider pooling borrowers to provide them with access to group health 
coverage. 
14It appears that the problem of partial loss of income is the main reason for the 
difficulties experienced by the South African dual index mortgage scheme mentioned 
earlier. If wage patterns in Mexico follow those in South Africa, similar problems are 
likely for some Mexican borrowers in the second decade of operation of Mexico's dual 
index mortgage scheme. 
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The work of Lee (1988) in the United Kingdom shows that inflation 
increases the dispersion or real wage increases, but the earlier work of 
Hamermesh (1986) found the reverse to be true in the United States. 
The ambivalent findings of these authors indicate that the risks do not 
appear to have a regular statistical basis. This and the moral hazard in-
volved in insuring items such as the number of overtime hours probably 
make the risk uninsurable. 
3.3.2 Unemployment 
Though governments offer some form of national unemployment 
insurance in several countries, there is little involvement by private in-
surance companies. This may be because unemployment appears to be 
subject to the three major causes of uninsurability referred to earlier: 
moral hazard, antiselection, and irregular statistical experience. IS 
There is clear evidence of moral hazard. Schmitt and Wadsworth 
(1993), in reviewing the research on its presence in unemployment in-
surance, report that in the United States and the United Kingdom the 
duration elasticity (the percentage increase in average duration of un-
employment related to a percentage increase in the unemployment ben-
efit) appears to be some 0.4 and 0.3, respectively. It appears probable 
that the moral hazard would be even higher with an increase in the 
replacement ratio.16 
Antiselection is also probable. At any given time unemployment 
falls heavily on particular categories of workers (defined by geography, 
by industry, or by skills). These categories are themselves unstable; it 
would appear to be difficult for potential private insurers to predict 
these changes ahead of the workers concerned. 
This degree of uninsurability provides a strong argument for some 
form of compulsory national unemployment insurance, which is desir-
able for reasons other than a reduction in the costs of housing finance. 
Doling (1990) mentions that Finnish banks respond to short periods 
of unemployment by rescheduling repayments. He points out that this 
is possible because of the shorter terms (10 years) of the original loans. 
This is consistent with a life cycle planning model that takes future 
uncommitted income into account and with Duncan's (1988) sample. 
In this sample, the major unemployment of the household head is a 
significant category, accounting for 19 percent of the large drops in 
income for men between 25 and 45. The importance of unemployment 
15There is also a cyclical aspect to unemployment. 
16The replacement ratio is that of unemployment benefit to potential earnings. 
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on defaults also is confirmed in studies by Canner et al. (1991) and 
Clauretie and Herzog (1990). 
3.4 A Note on Mortgage Guarantee Insurance 
Mortgage guarantee insurance protects mortgage lenders against 
losses on their lending. It normally is required for all loans issued 
by a lender, unless the borrower has made a sufficiently large down 
payment on the home so that the difference between the loan and the 
value of the home is large. I? Significant losses can occur in the event 
of a general fall in house prices that coincides with widespread income 
losses-due, perhaps, to a jump in the unemployment rate. The doubts 
expressed earlier (about the statistical regularity displayed by unem-
ployment rates) must be magnified in the case of mortgage guarantees, 
as the movement of house prices appears even less statistically stable. 
The insurance industry in the United Kingdom has suffered losses 
from mortgage guarantee insurance business of thousands of millions 
of pounds that may lead to a shortage of capacity in this market. These 
losses were particularly severe because housing prices in different re-
gions of the United Kingdom tend to move roughly in tandem. Herzog 
(1988) shows that in the United States default risks (and presumably 
house prices) in the different regions have not moved together. Mort-
gage guarantee insurance, therefore, has been able to continue to pro-
vide security to mortgage lenders in the United States. 
The author, however, has misgivings about mortgage guarantee in-
surance's long-term viability as an insurance product. If there is a prima 
facie case for its non-insurability, actuaries should consider the dam-
age that a spate of claims could do to the insurance industry. They 
also could lobby for some compulsory coverage to be provided by gov-
ernment. As with unemployment, a compulsory scheme could adjust 
premiums and benefits in order to ensure solvency. A more thorough 
argument for government intervention is given by Foster and Herzog 
(1981), which could be a base for such lobbying. As Grossman (1992) 
points out, however, government guarantees introduce a moral hazard 
because the mortgage lenders no longer bear the cost of inadequate 
evaluation of borrowers. 
17For example, in the United States borrowers must borrow no more than 80 percent 
of the appraised value of the home to avoid mortgage guarantee insurance. 
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3.5 Other Approaches to Managing the Default Risk 
Statistical models of housing prices could be useful in determin-
ing appropriate collateral requirements for loans and reducing default 
probabilities. Gyourko and Voith (1992) and DiPasquale and Wheaton 
(1993) provide two recent attempts at developing such models. 
Another approach would be to hedge the risks through financial 
options and futures on a house price index. Dwonczyk (1992) has de-
veloped just such an index in Australia. There might conceivably be 
persons hoping to buy homes in the future-in addition to financial 
speculators-who would find it attractive to take bull positions in these 
instruments. Although Dwonczyk expressed confidence that his index 
would be free of manipulation and accurately reflect the overall level of 
house prices, he also reported that adaptations were required for the 
23 submarkets he found in Sydney. It is unlikely that a market could 
develop in derivative instruments for each of these submarkets, which 
would limit their usefulness as hedging instruments. 
4 Administration 
4.1 Initial 
Most of the costs of lending are front ended, being expended in sell-
ing, evaluating the collateral, and performing the legal and administra-
tive procedures necessary to initiate loans. Various stamp duties and 
transfer taxes also may be payable. The costs of administration nor-
mallyare charged as a percentage of the amount outstanding. 
It is, therefore, necessary to estimate the average term of the loan in 
order to decide on a reasonable amortization period for the initial costs. 
The term will be longer if the mortgages are transferable (when the 
borrower moves to another house) or assumable (when the mortgage is 
assumed by the new owner). 
Charging the borrower directly for all the initial costs would be con-
sistent with the approach taken in the life insurance industry. It has the 
advantage of eliminating cross subsidies to borrowers who prepay and 
shifts the risk of underestimating the likely term of the loan from the 
institution to the borrower.18 It is likely to lead to lower charges, but 
because it emphasizes the initial costs, it may repel some prospective 
customers. 
l8In the United States, lenders do reduce the impact of prepayment of mortgages by 
requiring that initial expenses be paid in advance. 
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Ameliorating the tilt19 problem in countries with relatively high rates 
of inflation also should reduce the annual charges for initial costs. This 
is because there is less need to enter the lower end of the housing mar-
ket and to trade up as larger dwellings become affordable. 
4.2 Renewal 
The ongoing costs of installment collection are relatively small and 
particularly amenable to automation. Berger and Humphrey (1991) find 
that efficiencies in administration differ markedly from bank to bank 
in the United States, but are not especially related to size. The criti-
cal issue is limiting input costs. This appears to accord with the South 
African experience. Mergers and acquisitions appear not to be appro-
priate strategies for the control of expenses. 
4.3 Final 
Final expenses are fairly trivial if the loan is fully repaid on or before 
due time. Costs can be considerable in the event of defaults and fore-
closure. Insurance of the risks leading to foreclosure will reduce these 
costs. The administration costs of foreclosure should be added to the 
losses incurred as a result of the failure of the collateral, as a saving in 
one can create costs in the other. 
5 Real Interest Charges 
The real interest charge represents the balance between demand for, 
and supply of, loanable funds. It accords with the risk-free interest rate 
of financial theory and normally is regarded as the rate available on 
short-term government bills. 
Financial innovation by mortgage lenders is unlikely to yield any 
long-term advantage over other financial institutions in reducing the 
cost of the real interest rate-any innovations can be copied. The best 
that can be expected is for the lending institutions' financial instru-
ments on the liability side of their balance sheets to be up-to-date so 
that housing interest rates are comparable with the rest of the market. 
The development of secondary markets may be a necessary part of this 
activity. Actuaries could have a role in this area. 
19Level nominal mortgage repayments are tilted once they are adjusted for inflation. 
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Governments can, and frequently have, intervene(d) in financial mar-
kets to reduce the costs of housing finance. Mayo (1991), in summa-
rizing the World Bank's view on housing, suggests that governments 
should focus on enabling markets to function and that positive real 
interest rates are more appropriate. It is difficult to ensure that the 
subsidies inherent in artifiCially low interest rates help those they are 
intended to help. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
Numerous cost effective housing finance instruments have been de-
signed to adapt to unpredictable inflation. In addition, many conven-
tional insurance products are available to cover the risks to both bor-
rower and lender. Proper financial planning would indicate that these 
insurance coverages are required by borrowers whether or not they have 
home loans. Regarding these risks as part of the business of the mort-
gage lender represents, in some respects, an artificial increase in the 
cost of housing finance and can have the undesirable effect of unnec-
essarily dispossessing the homeowner. 
Actuaries could have two roles in managing the cost of housing. 
First, there is the need for better financial planning and for new insur-
ance products. Second, actuaries could find new fields in the employ 
of home lenders, especially in financial management and product de-
velopment. 
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Appendix 
The present value of annual payments in arrears over n years is 
given by: 
Value = X f. n (1 + Ii) 
k=l i=l (1 + 9i) 
(1) 
where X is the unadjusted base payment, X (1 + !I) is the first payment, 
the interest rate in year i is 9i, and the installment is increased by Ii in 
year i. 
Some of the more commonly used types of mortgages are defined 
in terms of the rules used to determine Ii, 9i, and n (n is assumed to 
be fixed unless otherwise stated). 
• Fixed interest mortgages: 
Ii 0 for all i; 
9i 9, a fixed rate of interest for all i. 
• Adjustable rate mortgages: 
9i 
a(n - i,9i-l) _ 1 for all i; 
a(n - i,9i) 
The market rate of interest in year i 
where a(n, r) is the present value of an n-year annuity immediate 
at a rate of interest of r per annum, i.e., 
( ) (1 - (1 + r) -n) a n,r = . 
r 
• Low-start mortgages: 
Bi 
Some low, predetermined, rate of increase for (i < k); 
a(n - i,9i-d _ 1 f . > k' 
( .) or t _ , a n - t,9i 
The market rate of interest in year i. 
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• Progressive annuities: 
Ii \11 : ~i/ - 1 where j represents the real rate of interest; 
Bi The nominal rate of interest in year i. 
• Price level adjusted mortgages: 
Ii The rate of inflation in year i; 
Bi (1 + Ii)(l + j) - 1 where j = the real interest rate. 
As a further generalization, these mortgages can be viewed as 
index-linked mortgages where Ii is linked to any index. 
• Dual index mortgages: 
Ii Growth rate of index (usually related to wages) in year i; 
Bi Interest rate in year i 
As n is no longer fixed, the series may not have a finite value. 
• Salary linked home finance: 
Ii The rate of growth of the borrower's salary 
Bi Ii + Yi 
where Yi is some nonnegative rate of interest in excess of salary 
growth. 
